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I. INTRODUCTION

The roles of transparency and public participation have become important
issues in investor-state arbitrations. This article addresses certain questions
relevant to these issues. Part H of this article explains the context in which
investor-state arbitration has developed and the challenges it poses. Particular
consideration is given to the challenges to arbitrators in dealing with the subject
matter of disputes, the undeniable element of public interest in the underlying
transactions and disputes, the evolution of the modem regulatory state that
plays an important role in developing environmental laws, and the need for
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coherence in the international arbitration system in addressing environmental
and other public concerns. Part III assesses whether there is a democracy
deficit in the current investor-state arbitration system. Further, it provides an
overview of the advantages and disadvantages of transparency and public
participation in investor-state arbitrations and suggests ways in which the
disadvantages could be counteracted. Part IV contains a brief conclusion.
II. CONTEXT

To understand the context in which considerations of transparency and
public participation in investor-state arbitrations occur, it is helpful to begin by
examining the power shifts inherent in the creation of the modem investor-state
arbitration system, the presence of public interest in investor-state arbitrations,
and the challenges that investor-state arbitrations present to arbitrators and the
international legal system.
A. Power Shifts
The advent of investor-state arbitration involved at least two important
shifts of power relevant to transparency and public participation.
First, there was a shift in power from states to foreign investors in terms
of making states more accountable to investors. Power shifted from states to
investors both substantively, because of the codification of strong investor
protection laws, and procedurally, because of the provision to investors of the
right to institute arbitrations against states and to choose the applicable
institutions or rules, including with respect to rules about transparency and
opportunities for public participation. The transfer ofprocedural power was not
necessarily permanent: States can decide to try to revise the international
investment agreements (IA) that accomplished these changes, but that would
require the agreement of the other State Party to the IIA and, even if the other
state agreed, it might not be possible to make such changes immediately
effective.
Second, the advent of investor-state arbitration resulted in a shift of power
from the public to states in that there was a decrease in holding states
accountable to their citizens. Disputes moved from public courts and other
public forums to typically non-transparent and non-accountable arbitral
tribunals that usually provided no opportunity for public participation. The
public could, in theory, hold the state's government accountable after the fact,
but it might not even know about the existence of the dispute or of the issues,
factual assertions, and arguments included in it, due to the often total lack of
transparency about investor-state arbitrations. In practice, however, foreign
investors are very distrusting of courts in many countries-particularly in
developing countries, due to concerns about inefficiency, having to fight a
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"home town advantage," and corruption. The latter, in fact can itself lead to a
lack of transparency and opportunity for public participation. Thus, this shift
is not as pronounced in some countries as it is in others.
B. Presence of Public Interest
The public interest in investor-state arbitrations arises from several
sources, some of which apply to every case and some of which apply only to
some.
Investor-state arbitrations involve the state in a sovereign capacity. The
public has a clear interest in such actions. This is self-evident in any
democracy. We submit it exists in non-democratic forms of government, as
well, though the domestic system might not recognize this.
More pointedly, every investor-state arbitration alleges wrongful behavior
by a state. Again, this raises an obvious public interest.
Additionally, investor-state arbitrations often involve either important
natural resources, such as oil and gas, hard rock minerals, forests, freshwater
resources, and fisheries, or major built infrastructure such as facilities regarding
water, sanitation, roads and other transport, power generation, and dams. The
latter, in turn, often implicate the delivery of important domestic services, such
as drinking water, sanitation, or electricity.
Investor-state arbitrations may also involve challenges to regulatory or
other decisions that penetrate deeply into traditionally domestic sovereign
prerogatives (e.g., regulations protecting health, safety, or the environment), or
activities that similarly have deep roots in domestic institutions (e.g., the
operation of ajury system or the response to a fiscal crisis). The public interest
in maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of these domestic policies and
governmental actions is obvious. Moreover, the empowerment of investor-state
arbitration began before the growth of the modern regulatory state, e.g., with
respect to health, safety, and the environment. The initial modeling of investorstate arbitration on traditional commercial arbitration thus did not occur with
these regulatory systems in mind.
The amount of money at stake in an investor-state arbitration can be very
large, as is evidenced by the spate of cases against Argentina. The potential
impact on the public raises an obvious public interest.
Finally, and somewhat controversially, the outcomes of investor-state
cases are being used as a type of precedent, so that a body of international
investment law is evolving from these cases. The public thus has an obvious
interest in these cases to the extent they are becoming a de facto source of
international law.
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C. Challengesfor Arbitratorsand the InternationalSystem
Reflecting in part the factors just described, investor-state arbitrations
create new challenges for arbitrators.
Investor-state arbitrations confront arbitrators with greater complexity.
Traditional commercial cases involved more-or-less standard commercial and
contract issues, and the primary impacts were limited to the two commercial
parties. In contrast, investor-state arbitrations typically involve interpretation
and application of sometimes murky treaty provisions, and they typically
involve the resolution of important public issues with wide-ranging domestic
impacts and to which a broad range of often delicate considerations are
relevant. Moreover, because of the age of most arbitrators on investor-state
panels, most of them have never studied regulatory subjects such as
environmental law that may lie at the heart of an investor-state arbitration.
Correspondingly, cases went from being primarily (if not exclusively) of
interest to the disputants and their shareholders, to being of interest, sometimes
intense interest, to the public as a whole. That interest sometimes even extends
beyond the responding state's borders.
Investor-state arbitration also raises new challenges for the international
arbitration system and the international legal system of which international
arbitration is a part. As more and more investor-state disputes are resolved
using arbitration, the credibility or legitimacy of the system becomes an
important issue. At the moment, credibility of the system as a whole, and also
of individual awards, is thwarted by non-transparency (which verges on
secrecy) and by inconsistent results. Indeed, the coherence of the international
legal system itself is even implicated by inconsistencies between awards with
respect to specific outcomes, treatment of transparency and public participation,
and jurisprudence.
Because there are more than 2500 IIAs, one could argue that the
inconsistent cases, or at least those between cases under different HAs, are
irrelevant because each IHA and the cases under it constitute lex specialis. That
is not convincing, however, because most of the disciplines read the same in
different IIAs and because arbitral awards are increasingly used in a precedentlike manner by arbitrations in different HA regimes. Also, of course, it is
difficult to defend that argument because there are such obvious advantages to
consistency.
HI. THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT

A. Do Deficits Exist?
There are major deficits in both transparency and public participation in
investor-state arbitrations. These deficits, if any, vary according to the
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institution in which the arbitration takes place and the rules that apply to the
arbitration.' These institutions and rules differ dramatically. Although the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)2 is clearly
the most transparent in general, none of the current institutions or sets of rules
have adequate means for the public to be aware of and be engaged in the
dispute.'
Investor-state arbitrations are based on the private commercial arbitration
model.4 Before the advent of institutional forums, parties agreed to ad hoc
arbitration, where the seat of the arbitration or venue would typically determine
the procedural rules governing the arbitration.5 Today, parties have a number
of different institutional forums from which to choose. Investment treaties will
invariably refer to different institutions or rules that could potentially govern
disputes, and the investors are typically free to choose which institutional rules
will govern their case.6 The choices could include private institutional forums,
such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA),7 the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC),8 the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA)9 and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), ° or international
forums or sets of rules, such as ICSID, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules" (which is not a
forum per se but provides governing procedural rules), the Permanent Court of
1.
See generally Daniel Magraw et al., Ways andMeans ofCitizen's Participationin Trade and
Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures (Soc'y of Int'l Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 53/08, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1 159770 (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
2.
International Centre for Settlement ofinvestment Disputes (ICSID), http://icsid.worldbank.org
(last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
3.
ICSID/15,

Magraw, supra note 1, at 9. See also ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES,
RULES

OF

PROCEDURE

FOR

ARBITRATION

PROCEEDINGS

(2006),

available at

http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSED/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter ICSID ARBITRATION RULES].

4.
5.
9(1991).

Magraw, supra note i, at 9.
See GeraldAksen,Adhoc Versus InstitutionalArbitration,2 (No. 1) ICC INT'LCT. ARB. BULL.

6.

Magraw, supra note 1, at 9.

7.

American Arbitration Association (AAA), http://www.adr.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).

8.

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), http://www.iccwbo.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).

9.
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), httpJ/www.lcia-arbitration.com (last visited
Feb. 10, 2009).
10.
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), http://www.sccinstitute.com/uk/Home (last visited
Feb. 10, 2009).
11.
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, UN Doc A/Res/31/98 (Apr. 28, 1976), availableat http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2009) [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules].
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Arbitration (PCA), 12 which like ICSID, is a forum and has rules, or a
combination of UNCITRAL or other rules and various forums. 13 Of these, the
private institutions tend to be less transparent and open to public participation. 4
This is hardly surprising, since private institutions were created with private
commercial disputes in mind. 5 Indeed, one of the major draws of arbitration
in the commercial field, was (and still is) the lack of transparency due to the
ability of the parties to decide most aspects of the process. 6 Partly because
these disputes were perceived as being purely private, public interest did not
play a key role in setting procedures in these institutions. 7 Nevertheless, given
the permeation of public disputes into a typically private forum, there is a need
for identifying democracy deficits within the system, whether on a private
institutional level or an international level.
Most investor-state disputes are resolved using ICSID or UNCITRAL
rules, although it is impossible to confirm the exact extent to which non-ICSID
arbitrations occur. 8 Except for ICSID, the existence of arbitrations is not
publicly recorded unless one of the parties chooses to do so.' 9 As a starting
point, therefore, the focus will be identifying problem areas within these sets
of rules.
1. Transparency
There are many deficits in the availability of information regarding
investor-state arbitrations. Generally speaking, the public has no way of
knowing any of the following:
1)
2)
12.

That a case or arbitration even exists;
What the allegations of wrongdoing are;

Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), httpJ/www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pagid=363 (last

visited Feb. 10, 2009).
13.

Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, ProceduralTransparency, in INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT LAw 731 (Peter Muchlinski, ET AL, eds., 2008).
14.

CompareAAA, COMMERCIAL RULES, availableat http://www.adr.org/commercialarbitration

(last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter AAA RULES] and LCIA, LCIA ARBITRATION RULES, available at
http://www.lcia-arbitration.com (follow "Arbitration" hyperlink; then select language) (last visited Feb. 13,
2009)

[hereinafter

LCIA

RULES]

and ICC,

http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4l99/index.htm
RULES] with ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 3.

RULES

OF

ARBITRATION,

available at

(last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter ICC

15.

See Aksen, supra note 5.

16.

James Carter, Dispute Resolution and InternationalAgreements, 4 (No. 2) INT'L Q. 100, 100

17.

Magraw, supra note 1, at 11.

18.

Id.

19.

Id. at 10.

(1992).
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3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

What the schedule of the arbitration is;
Who the arbitrators are likely to be, or are;
What legal issues are at stake;
What legal arguments and factual assertions are being made;
What oral presentations are being made;
What procedural or interim orders are issued; and
What the final award is.2"

As mentioned above, the degree of secretiveness, opacity, and nontransparency varies by arbitration rules and institutions and cases, but overall
there exists a serious lack of transparency. Generally speaking, the disputing
parties may agree to make any aspect of the arbitral procedure more transparent,
subject to those instances in which the arbitral tribunal may require
confidentiality, in spite of the parties' wishes. But, this occurs very rarely.
2. Public Participation
With respect to public participation, the main issue has been the ability to
submit amicus curiae briefs.2' These briefs make legal and factual assertions
that are relevant to the dispute from a public interest perspective. The
UNCITRAL rules and the private institutions' rules are silent on the
admissibility of such briefs.22 Until the revisions to ICSID arbitration rules in
2006, the ICSID rules were also silent on the issue. 23 However, under the old
ICSID rules, the Suez panel unanimously held that the tribunal had the power
to accept amicus curiae submissions under its residual powers in Article 44.24
The revisions contain a specific provision regarding amicus curiae petitions,
which is a step towards legally recognizing the validity and importance of such
submissions. 21 In contrast, investor-state disputes that use UNCITRAL rules
20.
For a more detailed discussion, see Magraw, supranote 1,at 9; Delaney & Magraw, supranote
13, at 731-750.
21.
See generally Samuel Krislov, The Amicus CuriaeBrief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72
(No. 4) YALE L.J. 694 (1963); Ernest Angell, The Amicus Curiae American Development of English
Institutions, 16 (No. 4) INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1017 (1967); Dinah Shelton, The Participation of
Nongovernmental Organizationsin InternationalJudicialProceedings, 88 Am. J. INT'L. L. 611, 618-619,
(1994).
22.
See UNCTRALARBITRATIoN RULES, supranote 11; AAA RULES, supranote 14; LCIA RuLES,
supra note 14; ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 3.
23.

Magraw, supra note 1, at 24; ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 3, at Rule 37(2).

24.
Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi
Universal, S.A (Spain) v. Argentine Republic (Arg.), Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and
Participation as Amicus curiae, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, I 15-16 (2005) [hereinafter Vivendi, Petition
for Transparency].
25.

ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 3, at Rule 37(2).
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or any of the private institutional forums are not subject to any provision
expressly allowing amicus curiae briefs. This uncertainty creates unpredictability and an incentive for investors to choose a forum or set of rules that is
more likely to exclude public participation.
Even under ICSID rules, there is no right to file an amicus curiae brief; the
decision by the tribunal to permit an amicus curiae brief is discretionary.26
While objections of the parties do not carry as much weight here as they do
with transparency issues, if both parties were to object tribunals may find it
harder to justify the benefit of allowing non-party submissions. 27 Also, amicus
status does not automatically give the petitioners any access to documents
submitted by either party. In Biwater Gauffv. Tanzania, the tribunal rejected
the petitioner's request to additional information, including most importantly,
documents containing the claims of the parties. 28 The primary reason was that
Biwater objected to the disclosure of information, which according to the
ICSID rules calls for the tribunal to reject the request. 29 However, the tribunal
also observed that it did not feel the information was necessary for the
petitioners to make their submissions on the ground that the dispute was a "very
public and widely reported dispute" and that the information that led to the
amici's"application to intervene" was sufficient to make further submissions.30
The logic of this is troublesome, because the participation of public groups is
made considerably more difficult3 ' and is likely to be less effective and helpful
to the tribunal if they are not given access to basic documents. Having
knowledge of the claims would allow petitioners to make more pertinent
arguments and raise more relevant factual points. In fact, in Biwater, the
tribunal laterjustified their divergence on one of the petitioner's assertions by
noting that the petitioners did not have all the relevant information.3 2 The
tribunal in Suez Vivendi also granted permission to file an amicus curiae brief
but denied access to the parties' submissions.3 3

26.

There is criteria for amicus status, however. Id.

See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, Procedural Order No. 5,
27.
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 12-14 (2007) [hereinafter Biwater No. 5].
28.

See id. 68.

29.

See id. IM18, 64; ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 3, at Rule 37(2).

30.

See BiwaterNo. 5, supra note 27,

65.

Discussions by the authors with Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, (regarding Biwater) and
31.
Marcos Orellana (regarding Suez- Vivendi).
32.
See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, 514, n.208 (2007) [hereinafter BiwaterAward].
33.

Vivendi, Petitionfor Transparency,supra note 24, IN 23, 28.
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B. Advantages andDisadvantagesof Transparencyand Public
Participation
Identifying the ways in which current rules do not provide transparency
and opportunities for public participation is the first step. Evaluating and
appropriately addressing these gaps requires an appreciation of the advantages
and disadvantages associated with making arbitral proceedings more accessible.
For present purposes, we will identify them at a general level, noting that they
must be applied to transparency and public participation separately at each
stage of an arbitral proceeding and may vary from case to case.
1. Advantages of Transparency and Public
Participation in Investment Disputes
Transparency and public participation provide a number of advantages,
many of which overlap. As such, it is simpler to address them collectively.
However, it is important to note that the two go hand-in-hand, in that
individually they provide the advantage of bringing about the other. Transparency is a prerequisite for public participation, as it is essential to providing
meaningful participation by members of the public. Public participation leads
to greater transparency because it facilitates the dissemination of information
and causes the dispute to be publicized to some extent.
The advantages of increased transparency and participation fall into
several categories:
HigherQualityDecision-Making: Increased transparency will improve the
quality of decision-making in investor-state arbitrations. One of the many
criticisms of using arbitration to resolve disputes that encompass a variety of
legal issues (from commercial practice to environmental standards) is the lack
of expertise of the arbitrators. Since the choice of arbitrator is left to the
discretion of the parties, there is no guarantee that the arbitrators will be wellacquainted with all the legal issues in an investment dispute. In most court
systems, there is no guarantee of this either; however, since opinions are
published, less-experienced judges will follow the reasoning set by more
experienced judges. It allows judges who are new to a legal issue to make more
accurate decisions, ones that are more defensible if challenged. Similarly,
transparency in the arbitral system would allow fellow arbitrators to reach more
accurate decisions.
Getting an accurate, and therefore defensible, decision is especially
important in arbitrations since there is limited ability to appeal. In most cases,
notably in the private institutions, there is no appeal at all. Under ICSID, there
is an opportunity to challenge the decision on very narrow grounds under the
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annulment process.34 Rights of appeal were purposely limited in arbitrations
to preserve some ofthe perceived advantages of arbitration over courts, namely,
obtaining a final decision quickly and inexpensively. Nevertheless, it is
important to ensure that each decision is legally and factually accurate.
Additionally, public disclosure of final awards and other materials discourage
improper behavior, to some degree. To the extent that arbitrators, lawyers, and
parties know their actions will be scrutinized by the public, the likelihood of
corruption in the arbitral process and activities leading up to the arbitration will
be lower." Greater transparency will improve the quality of decision-making
and lead to more consistent results, which in turn contributes to the credibility
of the system-as noted below.
Public participation can also assist in higher quality decisions because
amicus curiae briefs can often provide factual information and legal argumentation that would not otherwise be provided.3 6 Many tribunals have noted the
importance of amicus submissions in setting the context of a dispute.37 Often
times, the parties will not produce an accurate background of the dispute,
especially with respect to the wider policy concerns and issues that impact the
public. The tribunal in Biwater noted the importance of the amicus brief in
setting the context of the dispute, which was not otherwise provided.38
Additionally, an amicus brief may have key factual information that would
assist tribunals in making more informed decisions.39 Information gathering in
an investment context takes years, and it may be public interest groups that have
the statistics and background information that is needed.
Indeed, tribunals addressing issues in various fields (not limited to
investment) have relied on facts provided in amicus briefs because the amici
have a specialized knowledge or detailed statistical forecasts of key issues in
the dispute. For example, in Brazil Tyres, the WTO Panel relied on facts and
statistical data analysis provided in the amicus brief regarding the use of retreaded tyres and their effectiveness in reducing waste levels in Brazil.4" In the
Schmidt case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights noted information
34.

ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supranote 3, at Rules 52-54.

35.

Consider, for example, the adage, "Sunshine disinfects." Delaney & Magraw, supra note 13,

at 761.
36.
See Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence ofAmicus CuriaeBriefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 830 (2000).
37.
See, e.g., Methanex Corp. (Can.) v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction
and Merits, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 26-29 (2005) [hereinafter Methanex Award]; BiwaterAward,supra note 32,
IN 355, 358, 359, 392.
38.

Biwater Award, supra note 32, IN 355, 358, 359, 392.

39.
Panel Report, Brazil-MeasuresAffecting Imports ofRetreadedTyres, 114-40, WT/DS332/R
(June 12, 2007).
40.

See id.
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provided in an amicus brief explaining the relationship between Latin American
federal constitutional provisions and its application to professional licenses.4 '
In the investment context described above, amicus briefs provide tribunals with
specialized information that relate to public interest concerns in a dispute. For
example, the Suez!Vivendi tribunal granted five NGOs amicus status because
they had expertise in water distribution and sewage systems that were central
to the case:
The factor that gives this case particular public interest is that the
investment dispute centers around water distribution and sewage
systems of a large metropolitan area... [g]iven the public interest in
the subject matter of this case, it is possible that appropriate nonparties may be able to afford the Tribunal perspectives, arguments,
and expertise that will help it arrive at a correct decision.42
Further, amicus briefs can contain legal arguments that the parties chose
not to include in their own claims.43 In Methanex, the tribunal pointed out that
the briefs addressed "important legal issues that had been developed by the
Disputing Parties.""
The briefs were submitted by three environmental
NGOs 45 and presented public interest related concerns, in particular, how
international law promotes deference to the government when determining
human health and environmental protections. In Biwater, the tribunal made
specific use of the amici's legal arguments concerning investor responsibility
in the context of fair and equitable treatment.46 In applying the threshold test,
the tribunal took "into account the submissions of the Petitioners ... which
emphasize countervailing factors such as the responsibility of foreign investors,
both in terms of prior due diligence as well as subsequent conduct."47 In the
Schmidt case, the amici's legal arguments were taken into account in the final

41.
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism
(Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, 60 (Nov. 13, 1985), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_ 1!4e.htm
(last visited Feb. 19, 2009) (referring to an amicus curiae brief submitted by the Federacion Latinoamericana
de Periodistas that said that some Latin American constitutions establish licensing requirements for
professions).
42.

Vivendi, Petitionfor Transparency,supra note 24, N 19, 21.

43.

See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 21, at 614.

44.

Methanex Award, supra note 37,

29.

45.
Id. 28 (noting that amicus briefs were submitted by the International Institute for Sustainable
Development and Earthjustice, on behalf of the Bluewater Network, Communities for a Better Environment
and the Center for International Environmental Law).
46.

Biwater Award, supra note 32,

47.

Id. 601.

370-71, 373-75, 378.
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decision, although this was not explicitly stated in the award.48 These examples
demonstrate that amicus curiae briefs can lead to higher quality decisions.
Democratic Values andRealization of Human Rights: The involvement
of the state in investment agreements, hence the investor-state dispute, raises
questions of democratic governance and the necessity of adhering to human
rights. Access to information or freedom of information is a well-recognized
right in democratic systems around the world. In many countries, this has been
a hard-fought battle and has lead to the realization that citizens are entitled to
information regarding government actions that directly affect them. Recently,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared that access to information
is a human right. It asserted that Article 13 of the American Convention on
Human Rights includes the right to "seek, receive and impart" information49 and
to public information is a requisite for the very
proceeded to state that "access
50
democracy.
of
exercise
On an international level, states have recognized the importance of access
to information in environmental matters and dispute settlements.5 1 Principle 10
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development asserts that every
individual must have access to information, the opportunity to participate in
decision-making, and access to redress and remedy.52 While the principle
relates directly to environmental decision-making on a national level, the action
plan under the Declaration emphasizes the need for access to information on an
international level to achieve sustainable development. An analogy can be
drawn here to investor-state disputes because the investment projects
undertaken by private investors and governments are for the purpose of
development and invariably have environmental impacts. By their very nature,
investment agreements raise the types of environmental and developmental
issues that states are beginning to make provisions for, in terms of transparency
and public participation.

48.
This idea is from a Discussion between Daniel Magraw and Thomas Bergenthall, President of
the arbitral tribunal.
49.
Reyes v. Chile, Case 12.108, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 60/03, OEAISer.UV/II. 118, doc.
70, rev. 2,159 (2003), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/60-03.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2009).
50.
Id. 61; G.A. Res. 1932, 1, OAS Doc. AG/Res. 1932 (XXXII-O/03) (June 10, 2003),
availableat http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga03/agres_1932.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development principle 10, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874,
51.
availableat http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/pdf/RIO_E.PDF (last visited Feb. 23,
2009); Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice
in Environmental Matters, preamble, art. 3, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S 447, available at
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf (last visited Feb. 23. 2009).
52.

Rio Declaration, supra note 51.
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The most important application of the Rio Principle is the Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), adopted on June 25,
1998, in Aarhus, Denmark, and entering into force on October 30, 2001."3 This
is the first internationally binding mechanism for access to information and
public participation in environmental matters. It was negotiated between
countries of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE),
but is open to all countries to adopt. To date, forty-one countries and the
European Community (EC) have adopted the convention.54
It is clear that access to information and public participation in decisionmaking is key to democratic governance, and that this is recognized on both
domestic and international levels. Allowing greater transparency and public
participation in investor-state arbitrations would facilitate the sentiment
demonstrated by the efforts to democratize environmental decision-making and
dispute settlement. Further, it assists individuals to realize the rights in which
they are entitled. Indeed, access to justice is not valuable unless there is awareness of such access. While public participation provides access to disputes that
concern the public, transparency promotes the awareness ofthe disputes, which
is vital to realizing the right to information and participation. Additionally, the
developments in public disclosure and access to information contribute to a
general trend of "good governance."" This trend is one that incorporates core
democratic values, specifically the idea that governments must take into
account wider interests and be accountable for their actions. Since investorstate arbitrations render decisions that critically affect the public with respect
to a transaction that involves the state, transparency and participation are
essential to good governance. Furthering good governance standards also
provides other advantages, such as the protection of interests and accountability, which are discussed below.
ProtectionofInterests: One of the main problems with investment and/or
development projects in developing countries is that individuals who are
56
affected by them often are not aware of their interests or how to protect them.
While there may be consultations with such individuals at the planning stage
of projects, affected communities rarely participate in dispute resolution. The

53.
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Aarhus Convention, Convention
on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters (2008), http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
54.
10,2009).
55.

UNECE, Status of Ratifications, http://www.unece.orgfenv/pp/ratification.htm (last visited Feb.
Magraw, supra note 1, at 10.

56.
This idea is from comments made during a discussion with members of the World Bank
Inspection Panel, CIEL Event, Oct. 10, 2008.

ILSA Journalof International& Comparative Law

[Vol. 15:2

problem there is twofold: a lack of awareness on a general level as to the
existence of a dispute and an inability to obtain meaningful information other
than what the parties choose to provide. Transparency in arbitrations would
alleviate some of these problems, because at the very least, the existence of a
dispute would be public knowledge. Additionally, allowing some access to the
details of the dispute-those within the bounds of confidentiality interestswould make any participation more meaningful, thereby providing higher
quality decisions as mentioned above.
Public participation, through the submission of amicus curiae briefs,
provides an opportunity for the public to protect interests that they may have.
Not only does it enable them to voice their perspectives on the matter, it also
allows them to raises legal arguments or facts that were not raised by the
parties. There may be arguments that the parties will not make within the
confines of each other's claims that are especially pertinent arguments to be
made in light of the public interest. Additionally, the public can make an
amicus petition without having to rise to the level of an intervener to the case.
This is beneficial because public interests can be very broad and do not
necessarily fit within the traditional third party intervener's level of interest.
It also means that the parties can maintain the level of confidentiality dictated
by the proceeding with respect to non-parties. Of course, this can be problematic as maintaining strict confidentiality with respect to amicus petitioners
leads to lower quality contributions and may not serve to protect the public
interest. However, that is not to say that a balance cannot be reached between
disclosing essential information and protecting confidential information. Until
this balance is reached and there is greater international recognition for public
interest rights, public participation through amicus status in arbitral proceedings
will serve to ensure that, at the very least, these interests are heard.
Consistency: Transparency of process and of decisions brings more
consistency to investment arbitrations. Although, in practice, there is no system
of precedent in arbitration, if there is an arbitral decision on point, arbitrators
are likely to look to it for guidance.57 Therefore, there is already a developing
sense of consistency within the system, one that greater transparency would
develop further. Note, however, that arbitrators can only make the procedural
and analytical links if the cases are published and more publicized than they
currently are. In investor-state arbitrations, consistency is all the more
important due to the greater public interest that is at stake in many of the
outcomes and the fact that there is no possibility of appeal. As many people are
affected by tribunal decisions, consistency is necessary to achieve certainty and
a meaningful opportunity to participate. Consistency is also desirable to the
parties and the larger international community.
57.

If not for guidance, then to distinguish themselves from the previous decision.
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First, it creates certainty within the system. This is good for the investors
and states directly involved in the process because it allows them to anticipate
outcomes better and thereby plan their actions more productively. On a
procedural level, it allows for more efficient discovery and confidentiality
discussions. It also benefits the system generally as it provides legitimacy,
which is discussed below. Further, from a public participation perspective,
consistency in procedures and procedural decision-making assists public
interest groups to organize their submissions and requests more effectively. It
not only provides a clear structure for participation, but it also informs public
participants as to the types of requests that are likely to succeed, thereby
allowing them to place emphasis on more important and relevant requests/
issues. Second, it would develop similarity of treatment on an international
level, in other words, a more coherent body of law dealing with investment
disputes. By relying on previous decisions, a system of precedent will develop
and lead to coherent rules dealing with investment disputes. This is in the
interests of the parties, the public, and the international community as a whole.
Dispute settlement is more efficient when there is a coherent body of law, and
it allows international actors to interact with each other more effectively and
confidently. Further, coherence leads to higher quality in decision-making
(addressed above), and it creates opportunities for systemic reform (discussed
below).
Thus, transparency is key to both certainty and coherence in investment
disputes.
Legitimacy: As noted above, legitimacy and credibility are important in
the context of the international arbitration system, due, for example, to the high
number of investor-state disputes, and the use of arbitral decisions as precedent.
Transparency helps to legitimize systems as a whole as it increases awareness
of the process and creates opportunities to improve problem areas. Particularly
in the investment arbitration context, transparency reduces the secrecy, and
therefore distrust, of the proceedings and reassures the public as to the process.
Public participation also reduces the secretiveness of the process and makes it
more like courts, which is more familiar and accepted by the public.
Accountability: As noted above, there has been a decrease in holding
states accountable to the public in the investment context. This was achieved
by moving dispute settlement proceedings to a private context to which the
public would not have access. However, with increasing calls for democratic
governance, holding individuals and governments accountable for their
decisions and actions has become more important. Transparency helps
facilitate this accountability with respect to those participating in dispute
settlement, and it includes actions taken in the lead up to the arbitration as well.
Implementation: Implementing decisions of the arbitral tribunal can be
difficult if there is public opposition to it. Governments that have cooperative
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members of the public tend to implement decisions, laws, and treaty provisions
with greater effect than governments that do not. The public are less likely to
disapprove of a decision or process in which they participated or even had a
right to participate. As such, public participation may lead to more effective
implementation because public acceptance of outcomes of a process they
participated in is more likely. On a more practical level, public participation
would benefit implementation because members of the public are more likely
to become involved in implementation if they participated in the decisionmaking process."
Systemic Reform: Transparency is particularly important in ensuring
systemic improvements in the areas of law that are covered in investment
arbitrations. It allows governments, persons, and institutions to observe the
wider implications of the laws in existence and identify what works and what
does not. This leads to the creation of better laws and institutions and also
improves the credibility of investment arbitration as a valuable forum for all
interested actors.
Demonstration: Both transparency and public participation in investment
arbitration would provide a model of an accessible system for domestic legal
systems. Along with increasing coherence in the system, demonstration helps
promote the rule of law.
2. Disadvantages of Transparency and Public Participation
in Investment Disputes
Several disadvantages may be associated with providing greater transparency and opportunities for public participation in trade and investment
dispute settlement procedures. In some cases, tribunals and institutions have
developed methods of reducing the disadvantages. These methods are
presented in this section to provide a more complete understanding of the actual
extent of the disadvantages. The disadvantages posed by increased transparency and public participation fall into several categories:
Increasedcosts: The process of making information public necessarily
entails administrative costs to tribunals, thus increased transparency will
increase tribunal costs to some extent. Public participation increases costs on
the part of the parties, insofar as they respond to any amicus curiae briefs or to
other requests by the amici, and the tribunal to the extent that it spends time
ruling on amici status, ruling on other requests by amici,considering the briefs,
and using the briefs in its final award. The Methanex tribunal noted that "the
acceptance of amicus submissions might add significantly to the overall cost of

58.
This follows from the political adage, "Ifyou want people to be on board at landing, they should
be on board at take-off."
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the arbitration" and that there is a risk of "imposing an extra burden on one or
both the Disputing Parties."59 Since arbitrations are intended to be less
expensive than other binding dispute resolution techniques, excess costs can be
very problematic and potentially discourage the use of arbitration.
Some institutions and tribunals have introduced mechanisms to curb these
costs. One method is the introduction of page limits. This is achieved on an
institutional level by setting clear limits in the provision for public
participation, like the NAFTA Free Trade Commission that set limits of five
and twenty pages for the application of amicus status and the brief,
respectively.6" In other situations, the tribunal may set limits to reduce the
material that it and the parties would have to consider.6 Another method is the
use of strategic collaborations. For example, in Biwater, five NGOs
collaborated on one amicus brief, which was submitted to the tribunal.6 2 In
Bechtel v. Cochabamba,a petition to open the case to the public was supported
by over three hundred citizen groups from forty-one countries.63 Further, a
number of non-governmental organizations were represented by eight parties
to make a formal request for amicus status in the arbitration.' This type of
collaboration reduces costs for the tribunal and the parties as well as the public
participants, and it makes the decision-making process more efficient.
Delay: Making information available and allowing public participation
can cause delays in the resolution of disputes. Transparency can entail allowing
time for information to be posted publicly (on the Internet or through the media)
59.
Methanex Corp. (Can.) v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third
Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae,"
50 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/6039.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Methanex Amici Curiae].
60.
COMMISSION

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, STATEMENT OF THE FREE TRADE
ON NON-DISPUTING

PARTY

PARTICIPATION

(2003)

§

B2(b),

B3(b),

available at

http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Regional/NAFrA/asset-upload-file660-6893.pdf(last
Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Statement Non-DisputingPartyParticipation].

visited

61.
Biwater No. 5, supra note 27, 60a (setting a limit of fifty pages on an amicus curiae
submission). See also Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and
Vivendi Universal, S.A. (Spain) v. Argentine Republic, Order in Response to a Petition by Five NonGovernmental Organizations for Permission to Make an Amicus Curiae Submission, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/I 9, 27 (2007) [hereinafter Vivendi, Petition by Five NGOs] (providing a thirty page limit for the
amicus curiae brief).
62.

See Biwater No. 5, supra note 27,

60a.

63.
CIEL, Three Hundred Citizen Groups Call on Secret World Bank to Open up Bechtel Case
Against Bolivia, Aug. 29, 2002, CIEL, http://www.ciel.org/Tae/BechtelBoliviaAug02.html (last visited
Feb. 19, 2009); Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia, Petition of La Coordinadora Para la Defensa Del Agua y Vida,
La Federacion Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones Regantes, Semapa Sur, Friends of the EarthNetherlands, Oscar Olivera, Omar Fernandez, Father Luis Sanchez and Congressman Jorge Alvarado to the
Arbitral Tribunal, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (2002) [hereinafter Bolivia].
64.

Bolivia, supra note 63.
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and/or for information to be translated. Public participation can cause delays
due to the time spent deciding whether to accept amicus briefs, awaiting
responses from the parties, and then considering the briefs. Some of these
delays have been curtailed by imposing page limits (discussed above) and strict
time limits for submission. It is possible for tribunals to create a tight schedule
for addressing public concerns. Additionally, the tribunals are not required to
use or even read the briefs; it is left to the discretion of the tribunal to use the
brief if they find it helpful.
Impaired Confidentiality and Weakened Secrecy: As noted above, less
transparency is one of the factors that may draw private parties to arbitration,
as it maintains confidentiality in ways that court systems do not. Increased
transparency, by definition, results in less confidentiality, and is therefore a
disadvantage for the investors and perhaps for the governments, too. There is
also a risk that secret information will be inadvertently disclosed during more
transparent proceedings.
Public participation also leads to impaired
confidentiality to the extent that transparency takes place to allow for the
preparation of amicus briefs. This is a tension that may be hard to resolve. On
the one hand, parties need confidentiality, but on the other, public participants
need information to make more informed submissions. So far, tribunals seem
to favor confidentiality and have refused access to parties' claims and other
evidence that would be helpful to public participants. 65
Compromise ofProceduralIntegrity and Interferencewith Proceedings:
Transparency and full public disclosure can breach obligations to observe the
procedural integrity of the dispute and not to aggravate the dispute. The fear
is that by disclosing arbitration proceedings, the dispute becomes politicized
and subject to pressure by the media and the general public. In the Biwater
case, Biwater argued that campaigns by NGOs, the public, and the media were
threats to the procedural integrity of the dispute, and also that there were risks
of aggravation and exacerbation of the dispute.66 The tribunal issued an order
of confidentiality, noting that it has the right to direct parties not to take actions
that would exacerbate the dispute and that this includes protecting the tribunal's
mandate to determine the dispute without external pressure or trial by the media
and ensuring a level playing field.67
Amicus briefs raise numerous concerns with respect to inference of
proceedings and procedural fairness. Critics point out that some persons who
request amicus status are against the objectives of investment projects and thus

65.

See, e.g., Vivendi, Petitionfor Transparency,supra note 24; Biwater No. 5, supra note 27.

66.
See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, Procedural Order No. 3,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, In 12, 15-17 (2006) [hereinafter Biwater No. 3].
67.

Id. 163.
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frustrate the goals of arbitration by participating in the proceedings.6" However,
it should be possible for tribunals to recognize such a situation and limit the
discussion to issues in dispute. Another concern is the nature of support the
amicus brief provides. The Methanex tribunal recognized that amicus briefs
can undermine equal procedural protections for each party in light of what it
perceived to a greater likelihood of arguments presented by the amici being
more likely to favor respondent countries.69 As such, the tribunal was
concerned that the Claimant would require whatever protections may be
necessary.7 °
Permitting amicus submissions directly to the tribunal also creates
problems with regard to the disputing parties' interest in controlling the
information that the tribunal considers.7 Of course, this creates a burden on
parties if they have to rebut facts or legal argumentation presented in the brief.72
This is especially problematic because the amici are not required (or even
allowed, in a practical sense, because of page limits) to prove facts that they
present to the tribunal.7 3 The lack of quality control in this regard may threaten
the integrity of the proceedings. Finally, there is a general loss of control over
the arbitration as the introduction of new facts and arguments could affect a
party's tactics. However, this is no different from anticipating the opposing
party's submissions or questions from the tribunal.
UnequalAccess to Amicus Submission Process: Since the submission of
amicus briefs requires resources, it may disadvantage NGOs or third parties in
developing countries. As such, it is possible that they may be underrepresented in the public participation process. In practice, NGOs from
developing countries have tended to collaborate with those in developed
countries to the extent that those NGOs reflect public interests in developing
nations. This is enhanced by the requirement of submitting a single brief as
mandated by certain institutions and tribunals. Nevertheless, there is no
mechanism to ensure that persons submitting briefs actually represent the public
interest and do not use the submission process to forward their own agendas.
A related concern is that NGOs are more likely to support respondent countries
or governments and prejudice the private investors.

68.

Id.

69.

Methanex Amici Curiae,supra note 59,

32, 34.

70.

Id.

71.

Id.

50.

72.
Brigitte Stem, The InterventionofPrivateEntitiesandStateas "Friendsof the Court" in WTO
Dispute Settlement Proceedings, in PATRICK F.J. MACRORY ET AL, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
LEGAL, EcoNoMIc AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1427, 1456 (2005).
73.

See id. at 1438.
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Potential Conflicts of Interest: There is a risk that the arbitrators that
constitute the tribunal may have relationships with persons submitting amicus
curiae brief in a way that creates a conflict of interest.74 The pool of arbitrators
consists of experts that could have connections to NGOs or individuals within
NGOs, and this can be hard to detect on a superficial level. Unlike the
safeguards in place for detecting conflicts of interest between arbitrators and
parties, there is no specific mechanism to address conflicts between non-parties
and arbitrators. NAFTA requires that persons seeking amicus status provide
certain information, for example, information regarding those who financed the
brief.7 5 However, it does not specify that the purpose of providing this
information is to determine whether there is a conflict of interest.76 So far, in
investor-state disputes, there is no specificity either,77 although the Suez- Vivendi
tribunal did set similar requirements to NAFTA for the NGOs that submitted
an amicus brief.78
C. Means of Minimizing Disadvantages
While there are a number of possible disadvantages posed by increasing
transparency and public participation in the arbitral system, there are many
ways in which they can be curbed. The following describes some existing
methods and means of improving them as well as additional methods that could
effectively limit disadvantages. They are:
Page and subject matter limits on amicus briefs: Limiting pages and
subject matter can help to reduce the costs and delays associated with handling
amicus briefs. Setting page limits reduces the amount of material that disputing
parties have to respond to and that tribunals have to assess.79 Subject-matter
limits can help reduce delay and costs by limiting the amicus briefs to important
issues within the scope of the dispute.80 As noted above, some institutions set
an overall limit applicable to all cases, and some tribunals set their own limits
depending on the case. While having an institutional limit reduces the time
tribunals would have to spend determining page limits, it may not give optimal
results because there may be cases where the subject matter requires greater
74.
Ruth MacKenzie, The Amicus Curiaein InternationalCourts: Towards Common Procedural
Approaches?, in CIVIL SOCIETY, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND COMPLIANCE BODIES 295, 300-01, n.22
(2005).
75.

Statement Non-Disputing PartyParticipation,supra note 60

76.

See id. B6.

77.

Vivendi, Petitionfor Transparency,supra note 24,

78.

Id. 25.

79.

See supra Part I1.B.2.

B2(c)-(f).

27.

80.
See, e.g., ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 3, at Rule 37(2)(b) (providing that amicus
curiae briefs shall "address a matter within the scope of the dispute").
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depth. Therefore, some discretion should be given to the tribunal to determine
what limits to place or to extend institutional limits if necessary (even if there
is a set limit).
Using the Internet andotherelectronicsources to reduce costs and delay:
One of the best ways to reduce costs and delays with respect to public
disclosure of information is to use the Internet. Compared to publishing the
information in print, the Internet is low-cost system of making proceedings
more transparent. For example, ICSID maintains a register and publishes all
relevant information on its website. As such, the financial costs of
dissemination are lessened, and there is no delay in the dispute settlement
proceedings. Of course, the information is confined to matters pertaining to the
existence of the dispute and the issues involved. There is no necessity to
include confidential information, and what is confidential can be determined in
the course of proceedings, before dissemination.
A related issue is the developing trend in investment arbitration to open
hearings to the public. Today, the United States, Canada, and Mexico promote
open hearings in NAFTA investment arbitrations."' The revised ICSID rules
now give tribunals the authority to allow open hearings if the parties do not
object. 2 Current examples of open hearings show that they can be held
successfully without disrupting or delaying the proceedings. Additionally,
there are low-cost ways of allowing access to the public. The first examples,
that of UPS and Methanex, show that live closed-circuit broadcasts can be used
to great effect.8 3 ICSID has also broadcast live hearings via closed-circuit
television in the Canfor case. 4 These cases show that open hearings are
possible at a low cost and without causing delay or other problems. Costs could
be lowered further by web casting public hearings, as has been done by the
International Court of Justice. 5 Web casts reach a wider audience than closedcircuit hearings, which increase transparency while reducing costs. Note that
as with disclosure generally, steps should be taken to protect confidential,

81.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, STATEMENT ON OPEN HEARINGS IN

NAFTA CHAPTER ELEVEN ARBITRATIONS
Agreements/Regional/NAFrA/assetupload

(2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_
file 143_3602.pdf(last visited Feb. 23, 2009) [hereinafter US.

Statement]; OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT--"A DECADE OF ACHIEVEMENT" (2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_
Library/PressReleases/2004/July/NAFTAFreeTradeCommissionJointStatement__ADecade of Achievement.html?ht,,

(last visited Feb. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Decade ofAchievement].

82.

ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 3, at Rule 32(2).

83.

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), TRANSPARENCY
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privileged, or sensitive information, so as to minimize any disadvantages in
holding live public hearings.
Tight schedules for amicus curiae submissions and timely disclosure of
briefs, transcripts,final awards,and any other submission made to a tribunal:
Reasonably tight deadlines for amicus curiae submissions can help in a number
of ways: it reduces delay in arbitration proceedings, it limits the time and
resources that NGOs and/or third parties spend preparing the briefs, and it
indirectly limits the amount of material in the briefs, thereby limiting what the
disputing parties respond to and the tribunal considers.86
Further, timely disclosure of key documents such as briefs, final awards,
and transcripts will assist persons submitting amicus briefs to be more efficient
in making their own submissions. Without access to basic information like the
pleadings or preliminary orders, the amiciwould have to depend on less reliable
sources in framing their petitions and submissions. This delays amicus
preparation as well as the parties' and tribunals' time in responding to the
material presented. However, it is important that the information be disclosed
in a timely fashion; ifthey are released only after the outcome of the arbitration,
then interests will not be realized, and there will be no effect on minimizing the
disadvantages of the participation that does take place. With the use of the
Internet, any costs incurred in doing so would be minimal. Indeed, there is
evidence of institutions and states moving towards disclosure of arbitral
documents, even timely disclosure in the more recent cases. The NAFTA Free
Trade Commission statement of July 31, 2001, stated that parties must make
arbitration documents available to the public.87 Following this, the United
States, Canada, and Mexico have posted most documents related to arbitrations
on their respective websites.88 ICSID awards and orders are published in the
ICSID review or are available on the ICSID website.89 Even awards given
under some bilateral investment treaties are available on investment arbitration

86. The Biwater and Vivendi tribunals both placed deadlines on amicus curiae submissions. See
Biwater No. 5, supra note 27, 60a (setting the deadline for the amicus curiae submission less than two
months after the tribunal granted the petition for participation). See also Vivendi, Petition by Five NGOs,
supra note 61, 27 (setting the amicus curiae submission deadline approximately two months after the
tribunal's decision to permit participation).
87.

NAFTA FREE TRADE COMMISSION, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT NOTES OF

INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN CHAPTER 1
88.

PROVISIONS

§§

Al-A2a (2001).

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA, STATEMENT OF CANADA ON OPEN

HEARINGS IN NAFTA CHAPTER ELEVEN ARBITRATIONS, available at http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-

agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/open-hearing.aspx?lang--en
2009); U.S. Statement, supra note 8 1; Decade ofAchievement, supra note 8 1.
89.
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websites.9 ° Timely disclosure of information is vital to better participation, and
the disadvantages are minimal.
Requirementthat thirdpartiesjointlysubmit a single amicus curiaebriefRequiring a single amicus curiae brief from all third parties can minimize
preparation costs and help NGOs or third parties from developing countries to
participate, because they can collaborate with NGOs in developed countries that
have more human and financial resources. Additionally, a single brief will limit
costs and delays associated with responding to and assessing amicus
submissions by the parties and the tribunal, respectively. It helps to streamline
the submissions process and to ensure that points are raised by the amici
without excess repetition. However, this can reduce the diversity of viewpoints
that are relevant to a dispute. Further, forcing several NGOs or third parties
with various perspectives to produce one brief often entails a time-consuming
process of collaboration to reach a final product. In situations where NGOs
from developed countries collaborate with NGOs from developing countries,
transnational communication adds to expenses and delays in preparing an
amicus brief.9 '
Requirement that information be provided about the third parties:
Individual tribunals or institutional rules should require the submission of
information regarding organizations or persons seeking amicus status to
determine whether there are potential conflicts of interest with the arbitrators.
Although this does take place to some extent (noted above), it needs to be done
for the purpose of identifying conflicts of interest. Even though amici are not
parties to the dispute, they should be treated as such in this respect so that the
disputing parties' entitlement to procedural fairness is not undermined.
Providefor the protection of confidentialbusiness information and state
secrets: A major concern associated with transparency and public participation,
as noted above, is the loss of confidentiality. Confidential business information
and/or state secrets can be inadvertently disclosed by increasing mechanisms
for transparency and public participation. However, much of this is alleviated
by the process of issuing confidentiality orders.
Under ICSID, this
determination is essentially up to the parties, because if one party objects,
information cannot be disclosed to third parties and this includes party claims,
evidence, witnesses, etc.92 While this is problematic in other respects

90.
See e.g., Investment Claims, http://www.investmentclaims.com (last visited Feb. 18,2009) and
Investment Treaty Arbitration, http://ita.law.uvic.ca (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
91.
Both the Biwater and Vivendi tribunals required groups of NGOs to submit a single amicus
curiae brief. See Biwater No. 5, supranote 27, 60a (providing that the five NGOs, from Tanzania and the
U.S., submit a single amicus curiae submission). See also Vivendi, Petitionby Five NGOs, supra note 61,
27 (requiring the five NGOs, from Argentina and the U.S., to file a single amicus curiae brief).

92.
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RULES, supra note 3, at Rule 37(2).
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(addressed above), it does ensure that information the parties consider
confidential is not released to any party outside of the dispute. Another way to
provide protection would be to hold closed proceedings for sensitive
information and preclude that from being discussed in open proceedings,
similar to an in camera proceeding in domestic courts. This would permit more
access to third parties while protecting information that is confidential, instead
of ruling out all evidentiary information or claims simply because one part of
it is confidential. Given the flexibility that tribunals have in determining procedure, it is more than possible to balance access to information and confidentiality.
D. Assessment of Advantages andDisadvantages
These advantages and disadvantages need to be analyzed with respect to
possible specific avenues for transparency and public participation, because
they play out differently for different avenues. For example confidentiality
plays a different role in settlement discussions than it does with respect to final
awards.
IV. CONCLUSION

Investor-state arbitration is increasingly important and increasingly
involves significant public interests, yet it is characterized by a serious
democracy deficit in terms of lack of transparency and opportunities for public
participation. This deficit, which varies according to the rules and institutions,
if any involved in a particular arbitration, should be remedied through careful
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of transparency and public
participation at each stage of the arbitral proceeding. Such an analysis reveals
many instances where transparency and public participation rules need to be
revised, utilizing available techniques for limiting or eliminating the possible
disadvantages.

